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Abstract 
We address the collusion problem in a reputation-driven multi-agent system where agents represent service providers, 
consumers, and a controller. A game structure is proposed where players are supposed rational and payoff 
maximizers. The main issue addressed in this paper is how to maintain a collusion-resistant reputation mechanism. 
We analyze the behavior of different players with respect to the strategies adopted by the opponents. We provide 
theoretical analysis of the game and discuss the pure and mixed strategy Nash equilibrium along with best response 
analysis to identify conditions under which the players adopt truthful dominant strategies. 
Keywords: reputation, multi-agent systems, game-theory; 
1. Introduction
In multi-agent systems (MASs), establishing reputation is a must, and in the recent years different
approaches to reputation have been proposed. Reputation is addressed by aggregating related parameters 
from different perspectives [1]. One important issue is the agents’ tendency to act maliciously to take 
advantage of the system’s vulnerability, which can be done by colluding with other agents. There have 
been some efforts addressing collusion resistance in reputation frameworks [1, 2]. However, some issues 
such as false alarms are yet to be addressed. In many existing frameworks, the malicious actions and 
collusion could be maintained by agents at any time (never end). A missing factor in these approaches is 
convergence towards a truthful setting. In this paper, the conditions that lead to this convergence are 
investigated using a game structure. 
In this paper, we consider a network of providers and consumers, which are equipped with mechanisms 
capable of maximizing their payoffs. The proposed framework also contains a controller agent whose 
responsibility is to make the system trustful. A consumer agent is a rational service consumer that initiates 
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requests hoping to obtain an acceptable quality of service (QoS). There is a reputation mechanism that 
regulates the process of consumers selecting providers by ranking them using their reputation. The 
controller agent denoted by Cg objectively maintains a sound reputation mechanism by taking the 
provider and consumer actions under surveillance. As a matter of fact, the Cg applies some penalties in 
order to discourage the providers and consumers from colluding and acting maliciously. 
The proposed framework is distinguished from existing frameworks, for example [2, 3], in the fact that 
a continuous game involving three players (provider, consumer, and controller agent) is modeled and 
analyzed. In this framework, the collusion between providers and consumers is thoroughly discussed 
(skipped in similar proposals) and the role of Cg in maintaining a sound reputation mechanism is 
discussed in details. The results of the proposed framework could be summarized as follows: (1) by 
analyzing different situations, rational agents (providers and consumers) can recognize some restrictions 
that encourage them to choose the best response leading to their maximum expected payoffs; and (2) the 
game-theoretic analysis enables the reputation mechanism designer to compute a detection threshold so 
that if reached, the mechanism will be collusion-resistant. These results are confirmed by simulations. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we define some preliminaries of our 
proposed framework. In Section 3, we provide a theoretical and empirically analysis of the reputation 
game (involving three agents but grouped into two players) and discuss some results regarding collusion 
resistant reputation mechanism based on the environment characteristics. We continue our discussions on 
the same direction of the theoretical analysis in the implemented environment and observe the impacts 
that environmental characteristics impose on agents’ behaviors. Section 4 discusses related work and 
finally Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. The Model 
This section points out the preliminaries regarding the proposed framework. 
Involved Agents. In our proposed model, we consider n consumer agents ݑଵ ǥݑ௠ (a typical consumer 
agent is denoted by u), m provider agents ଵ ǥݓ௠ (a typical provider agent is denoted by w), and a 
controller agent Cg. Each consumer agent u has a budget account in the system from which his requested 
services are paid and is equipped with a purchase mechanism that enables him to initiate a service request 
from a provider w specifying some buying parameters such as response time and price. Each provider 
agent w is characterized by his reputation, which affects his income in the system since the number of 
requests he can receive is reputation-dependant. He is also equipped with a selling mechanism that 
enables him to dynamically set up the selling parameters (response time and price) according to which a 
service is offered to the consumer agent u. The controller Cg is equipped with a supervision mechanism 
that enables him to investigate the truthfulness of the interactions among the involved agents and has 
access to the consumers’ accounts and providers’ reputations. 
Reputation Mechanism. The typical agent u posts a feedback f reflecting the extent to which the 
offered service by the provider agent (say w) is satisfactory. The feedback f belongs to the interval [-1; 1], 
where -1; 0; +1 respectively represent complete dissatisfaction, no answer from the provider, and 
complete satisfaction. The accumulated feedback (posted by different consumers over time) is used to 
compute the reputation value of providers. There are a number of frameworks [1, 4] that address the 
reputation assessment problem ranging from simple mean values to more sophisticated distributions. 
However, the way the reputation is computed does not have impacts on our results. In fact, we are mainly 
interested in fraud in the feedback pool. Since choosing a service from the network of services is very 
selective, provider agents compete to increase their reputation (which is supposed to bring more requests 
from consumers). In our model, the agent Cg is responsible for investigating the feedback pool to capture 
malicious actions. What we mean by fraud is that a provider agent w can collude with one or many 
consumer agents to support him by posting faked positive feedback, which would increase w’s reputation. 
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Consumer-Provider Strategy Profile. The consumer and provider agents follow 2 strategies: being 
truthful or malicious. In the truthful strategy, the provider provides the service and consumer posts the 
corresponding truthful feedback to the feedback pool. In the malicious strategy, the provider provides 
incentives (İ) to some consumers to motivate them providing continuous positive feedback even without 
receiving a service. Colluding with a consumer is aimed at increasing self reputation. This leads to 
increase provider’s market share and thus obtain higher income. Other malicious strategies are possible 
such as decreasing competitors’ reputation. However, to make the paper focused, we only consider the 
first possibility in this paper. 
Collusion Scenario. To better analyze the game, it is worthy to explain the collusion scenario in 
details. The collusion we take into account in this paper could be triggered by either the providers or the 
consumers. But to be consistent and more realistic in our discussions, we only consider the trigger from 
the consumer. The reason behind this is the fact that the consumer is the one that receives incentive and 
high quality service. Therefore, he is more amenable to collusion [5]. As discussed in advance in this 
section, the provider aims to increase his reputation to obtain more requests. Besides acting truthfully and 
gaining positive feedback, the reputation increase could be caused by motivating a consumer to post a 
number of continuous positive feedback. For simplicity, we skip the process of malicious consumer 
finding the malicious provider (in order to complete the collusion). Recall w and u, respectively as 
malicious provider and consumer. To make the scenario simple but without losing generality, let us 
consider only one provider w colluding with one consumer u (the generalization to n consumers is 
straightforward). The collusion agreement established between w and u clarifies the number of fake 
positive feedback that u is going to post for w. Associated with the feedback pool is a window that 
represents a number, publicly known, of feedback that is accumulated in a fixed period of time, for 
instance an hour or a day. In this scenario, ௪݂ is the percentage of this window that represents the fake 
positive feedback the consumer would post. Consequently, the provider receives ௪݂ percentage increase 
on his positive feedback. Therefore, his reputation increases and thus, the expected number of requests 
increases as well (we will use ȥ to denote the percentage of this increase). In this case, the malicious 
consumer would receive the amount of İ as incentive from the provider. This amount (i.e. İ) should be 
less than the amount gained by the provider (ߣ௪ߚ߰, where ߣ௪ represents the mean request number in the 
fixed period of time relative to the window, and ȕ denotes the price charged by w for offering the service) 
in the case of adopting the collusion strategy. Therefore, the provider always predicts the expected 
income before motivating a consumer to adopt the collusion. 
Controller-Provider/Consumer Connection. The controller agent Cg continuously investigates the 
feedback pool and his detection strategy is based on applying some dynamically changing thresholds (this 
aspect is detailed in Section3.2). Associated with the feedback pool is a fixed size window that Cg 
considers in his investigation. The parameter ݓ௖ represents the percentage of this fixed size window that 
Cg is going to analyze. The value ݓ௖ would differ over time and the provider and consumer agents need 
to estimate or predict it when deciding about their strategies of acting truthfully or maliciously. The 
detection probability reflects the controller agent’s accuracy in investigating the feedback pool. This 
probability could be increased over time when Cg applies some learning mechanisms to use information 
from past detections in the current investigation. Since the detection procedure does not affect the results 
of this paper, we only focus on the role of the parameter ݓ௖. After deciding to penalize the collusion, Cg 
notifies both the provider and consumer by sending them a report revealing the parameters regarding the 
penalty process such as the considered window parameter ݓ௖  and the percentage ݀ ௖݂  of detected fake 
feedback (explained in the following). 
Four possibilities can be analyzed: 
x Cg detects the actual collusion and gets +ʌ as payoff. We consider the parameter ܦ௖ as the accuracy of 
detection. In analyzing the feedback pool within the window percentage ݓ௖, Cg catches a percentage 
of this ݓ௖, denoted by ݀ ௖݂, as the fake feedback and the assigned penalty ( ሺ݀ ௖݂Ȁݓ௖ሻܲ݊)  to both the 
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provider and consumer is proportional to the detected fake feedback, where the public parameter Pn 
represents a maximum penalty assigned by Cg. When it affects the consumer, the penalty is applied to 
his budget (money is taken from his budget account in the system), and when it affects the provider, 
the penalty concerns his reputation, which then affects his income since the number of received 
requests will decrease. In this case, the report sent to both the provider and consumer reveals ݀ ௖݂ and 
ݓ௖. 
x Cg ignores the actual collusion and gets -ʌ as payoff. This is the worst case because the malicious 
provider increases his reputation and the malicious consumer receives the inventive of İ. This case, 
called false positive, decreases Cg’s accuracy in detection. 
x Cg detects the truthful action as collusion and gets -ʌ as payoff. This is also harmful in the sense that 
the truthful provider is losing his reputation and the truthful consumer is losing money because of Cg’s 
mistake. This is the case of false negative that negatively affects the Cg’s accuracy. 
x Cg ignores the truthful actions and gets + ʌ as payoff. Socially speaking, this corresponds to the best 
situation, and the objective is to encourage all the players to converge towards such a situation. 
3. Theoretical Analysis 
There are important details in this game. It is worthy to note that the stage game is the example of a 
typical moment considering three particular players, which is generalized to a repeated game between all 
interacting agents. Information obtained from each stage game is used in the rest of agent’s involved 
games. In this framework, we focus on identifying the optimum status where the collusion is discouraged 
at best. To have a better analysis on the payoffs of different players, we consider the situation where the 
provider and consumer act truthfully and the controller agent ignores the reaction as the ideal case. 
Therefore, in all the payoffs analysis in the rest of this section, we consider each payoff as the difference 
of the expected outcome of the chosen case with the ideal case. The expected gain/loss is computed using 
the variables that have been obtained in the past reports, such as the feedback window parameter ݓ௖ and 
the detected fake feedback݀ ௖݂. If there is no past report on collusion, we assume the existence of default 
values that the provider (who has never been penalized) would use to analyze the expected payoffs. 
If the collusion is detected, the controller agent penalizes the malicious provider and consumer, which 
would cause ሺ݀ ௖݂Ȁݓ௖ሻܲ݊ߣ௪ߚ money loss for the provider and ሺ݀ ௖݂Ȁݓ௖ሻܲ݊ money loss for the consumer. 
Therefore, the payoff of the provider would be െሺ݂݀௖Ȁݓ௖ሻܲ݊ߣ௪ߚ  and of the consumer would be 
െሺ݀ ௖݂Ȁݓ௖ሻܲ݊ for the case where the collusion was actually made, and െሺ݀ ௖݂തതതതȀݓ௖ሻܲ݊ߣ௪ߚ and െሺ݀ ௖݂തതതതȀ
ݓ௖ሻܲ݊ for the case where the controller has falsely considered the truth action as collusion. In this case, 
݀ ௖݂തതതതത is considered by the provider as the percentage of falsely detected rightful feedback. These values are 
previously reported by the controller agent in the penalty report. In case the collusion is ignored, the 
expected payoff for the provider would be the gained fee over the extra requests minus the incentive 
given to the consumer ߣ௪ߚ߰ െ ߝ (recall that ߣ௪, ߰ǡ ߚ respectively represent the mean request sent to w, 
reputation increase amount as a result of collusion, and service fee charged by the provider). This case 
would bring +ߝ for the consumer. Finally the case where the provider and consumer act truthfully, they 
both expect 0, which corresponds to the default case. 
3.1. Analysis of the Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium (PSNE) 
Considering the payoffs shown in Table 1, the group 1 is Cg and the group 2 is formed by provider w 
and consumer u. In pure strategy Nash equilibrium, w and u would consider to collude when the obtained 
payoff is more than the one obtained in the case of acting truthfully. In the case where Cg ignores the 
collusion, obviously this collusion brings more payoffs (ߣ௪ߚ߰ െ ߝ > 0 for w and ߝ > 0 for u). However, if 
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Cg penalizes and if the obtained payoff is more in the collusion case, the group 2 would choose the 
collusion as the dominant strategy. 










Proposition 1. In the repeated game of the stage game described above, if the falsely detected rightful 
feedback ݀ ௖݂തതതതത (reported by Cg) is more than the correctly detected fake feedback݀ ௖݂, the provider and 
consumer would choose the collusion as the dominant strategy. 
 
Proof.  In this repeated game, the payoffs are the summation of stage game payoffs, so since 
݀ ௖݂തതതത ൐ ݀ ௖݂ǡ σ ߣ௪ஶ ߰ߚ െ ߝ ൐ Ͳǡσ ߝஶ ൐ Ͳ 
σ ሺെ݀ ௖݂Ȁݓ௖ሻܲ݊ߣ௪ஶ ߚ ൐ σ ሺെ݂݀തതതത௖Ȁݓ௖ሻܲ݊ߣ௪ஶ ߚܽ݊݀ σ ሺെ݀ ௖݂Ȁݓ௖ሻܲ݊ஶ ൐ σ ሺെ݂݀തതതത௖Ȁݓ௖ሻܲ݊ஶ   
both w and u will always choose to collude whatever the strategy of Cg. ¤ 
The following corollary is a direct consequence of Proposition 1. 
Corollary 1. In the repeated game of the stage game described above, if the falsely detected rightful 
feedback ݀ ௖݂തതതതത  is more than the correctly detected fake feedback݀ ௖݂, penalizing the collusion is PSNE. 
Fig.1 shows two simulation results confirming Proposition 1 and Corollary 1. The left graph illustrates 
successful detection (reflected by݀ ௖݂) versus failure detection (reflected by ݀ ௖݂തതതതത ) of a controller agent in 
a network containing 1000 consumer agents and 200 provider agents. The right graph plots the number of 
collusion versus the time (number of runs of the simulation), which reflects the overall tendency to act 










Fig. 1. Pure strategy Nash characteristics 
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In this game, staying in PSNE is, socially speaking, a harmful situation for all the players. Continuing 
on PSNE, both groups would lose their performances. In fact, the PSNE is achieved due to temporary 
analysis that players do aiming to maximize their payoffs without considering probabilities of detection. 
Therefore, we need to consider the case where the payoffs of the players in group 2 are subject to the 
accuracy of Cg and his detection probability. To analyze the details of this case, we need to consider the 
mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. 
3.2.  Analysis of the Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium (MSNE) 
In the mixed strategy, we need to consider two probability distributions on the strategy profiles of the 
two groups of players (Cg and w & u). Let p be the probability of collusion, which is maintained by the 
provider and consumer. Therefore, 1-p is the probability of acting truthfully. The probability of collusion 
depends on many factors in the game. In fact, w and u would consider the Cg’s accuracy of detection, 
window size, and expected payoffs before performing any action. Let q be the probability of Cg 
penalizing the malicious action and therefore, 1-q is the probability of ignoring the action. This 
probability should satisfy two properties: (1) it increases with the Cg’s detection accuracy ܦ௖, which 
evolves over time; and (2) it also increases with the quality of choosing ݓ௖, the portion of the fixed size 
window that Cg is going to analyze. Equation 1 gives a definition of this probability that satisfies these 
properties. In this equation,  ௪݂ is the actual percentage of the fake feedback in the feedback pool. Notice 
that q א [0; 1] since 0 ൑ ܦ௖; ȁݓ௖ െ ௪݂ȁ ൑ ͳ. If the detection is completely wrong, then ȁݓ௖ െ ௪݂ȁ= 1, and 
if it is completely correct, then ȁݓ௖ െ ௪݂ȁ= 0, which means Cg is investigating a portion of feedback from 
the feedback pool where all of them are fake. 
q=ܦ௖ሺͳ െ ȁݓ௖ െ ௪݂ȁሻ  (1) 
We define Cg.pro = (q, 1-q) as the probability distribution of the Cg’s strategy profile and wu:pro = 
(p, 1-p) as the probability distribution of the strategy profile of group 2 players w and u. In the mixed 
strategy case, all the players need to estimate their expected payoffs with respect to their chosen strategies 
against the other player’s probability distribution. Let Ew(C,Cg.pro) (resp. Ew(T,Cg.pro)) be the expected 
payoff of the provider choosing to collude (resp. to act truthfully) against the probability distribution of 
the controller agent. In the same way we define Eu(C,Cg.pro), Eu(T,Cg.pro), ECg(P,wu.pro) (P for 
penalizing) and ECg(I,wu.pro) (I for ignoring). We obtain the expected values as follows: 
ܧݓሺܥǡ ܥ݃Ǥ ݌ݎ݋ሻ ൌ[ሺെ݀ ௖݂Ȁݓ௖ሻPnȜ_w ȕ]ሺݍሻ ൅ ሾߣ௪߰ߚ െ ߝሿሺͳ െ ݍሻ (2) 
ܧݓሺܶǡ ܥ݃Ǥ ݌ݎ݋ሻ ൌ ቂሺെ݀ ௖݂തതതതതതതȀݓ௖ሻܲ݊ߣ௪ߚቃ ሺݍሻ ൅ ሾͲሿሺͳ െ ݍሻ (3) 
ܧݑሺܥǡ ܥ݃Ǥ ݌ݎ݋ሻ ൌ[ሺെ݀ ௖݂Ȁݓ௖ሻPn]ሺݍሻ ൅ ሾߝሿሺͳ െ ݍሻ (4) 
ܧݑሺܶǡ ܥ݃Ǥ ݌ݎ݋ሻ ൌ ቂሺെ݀ ௖݂തതതതതതതȀݓ௖ሻܲ݊ቃ ሺݍሻ ൅ ሾͲሿሺͳ െ ݍሻ (5) 
ܧܿ݃ሺܲǡݓݑǤ ݌ݎ݋ሻ ൌ[൅ߨ]ሺ݌ሻ ൅ ሾെߨሿሺͳ െ ݌ሻ                         (6) 
ܧܿ݃ሺܫǡ ݓݑǤ ݌ݎ݋ሻ ൌ[൅ߨ]ሺ݌ሻ ൅ ሾെߨሿሺͳ െ ݌ሻ                         (7) 
Best Response Analysis. All the players in this mixed strategy game aim at maximizing their payoffs. 
Therefore, for all their adopted strategies, we need to consider the best responses and discard the other 
strategies. For instance, the provider, who is seeking for maximizing his payoff by choosing a specific 
strategy, would discard any strategy in which his expected payoff is less than any other strategy. Since 
each player in each stage game chooses between only two strategies, and since any of these strategies 
could be the best response in a particular situation, we analyze the case where the expected payoffs are 
equal. By so doing, we can compute a threshold, which is used to identify which strategy is dominant. If 
these expected payoffs are not equal, that means one strategy would lead to a higher payoff and therefore, 
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the player would select that strategy as dominant. In this case, the mixed strategy probabilities would be 
(1,0) or (0,1), which is back to the pure strategy case. 
The best response analysis in our mixed strategy game would enable the provider w and consumer u to 
obtain a probability threshold ሺߤሻ for their chosen strategy. Once the threshold is obtained, w and u would 
estimate the probability of the action to be chosen by Cg, and by comparing this probability with the 
threshold, they choose the best strategy that maximizes their payoffs. In the repeated mixed strategy 
game, w and u estimate the probability (denoted by ݍ௪) that Cg penalizes their action based on previous 
detections. This probability should satisfy the same properties as for Equation1 and is computed in 
Equation 8. In this Equation, the accuracy of Cg is public, but the window parameter wc is considered as 
the window parameter that is reported to w and u in the most recent penalty report. The parameter ௪݂ is 
also known to the provider and consumer. This probability could be compared against the obtained 
threshold ߤ by w and u to maximize their expected payoffs. 
q=ܦ௖ሺͳ െ ȁݓ௖തതത െ ௪݂ȁሻ  (8) 
 
Theorem 1. In the mixed strategy repeated game, there is a threshold ߤ such that if ݍ௪ ൐ ߤ, acting 
truthfully is the dominant strategy for group 2. Otherwise, colluding is the dominant strategy. 
Proof. We prove that the theorem holds for each stage game, so the repeated case follows. To find the 
dominant strategy for each stage game, we need to consider the case where the payoffs of the different 
strategies are the same. We have: 
ܧݓሺܥǡ ܥ݃Ǥ ݌ݎ݋ሻ ൌ ܧݓሺܥǡ ܥ݃Ǥ ݌ݎ݋ሻ ൌ൐ ݍ௪ ൌ ߤ௪ ൌ ሺߣ௪߰ߚ െ ߝሻȀሾሺ݀ ௖݂ െ ݀ ௖݂ሻȀݓ௖ܲ݊ߣ௪ߚ ൅ߣ௪߰ߚ െ ߝሿ
ܧݑሺܥǡ ܥ݃Ǥ ݌ݎ݋ሻ ൌ ܧݑሺܥǡ ܥ݃Ǥ ݌ݎ݋ሻ ൌ൐ ݍ௪ ൌ ߤ௨ ൌ ሺߝሻȀሾሺ݀ ௖݂ െ ݀ ௖݂ሻȀݓ௖ܲ݊ሿ
Let ߤ  = max( ߤ௪ , ߤ௨ ). If ݍ௪ ൐  ߤ , then Ew(C,Cg.pro) < Ew(T,Cg.pro) and Eu(C,Cg.pro) < 
Eu(T,Cg.pro), so the first part of the theorem follows, and the second part is straightforward. The 
threshold ߤ is the maximum of ߤ௪ and ߤ௨ (ߤ௪ in case ʹߝ ൏ ߣ௪߰ߚ and ߤ௨ otherwise). Ŷ 
Corollary 2 that follows directly from Theorem 1 gives the the condition under which the MSNE is 
obtained.  
Corollary 2. If the estimated probability of penalizing ݍ௪  exceeds the obtained threshold ߤ , then 
acting truthfully by w and u and being ignored by Cg is a MSNE. 
Theorem 2. A collusion-resistant reputation mechanism is achieved when the controller agent 
maximizes the value of ሺሺ݀ ௖݂ െ ݀ ௖݂ሻȀݓ௖ሻܲ݊. 
Proof. From Theorem 1, we deduce that since ݍ௪  א [0, 1], if ߤ ൒ 1, then collusion would be the 
dominant strategy for the provider and consumer. From  proof of Theorem 1, ߤ ൒ 1 occurs when ݀ ௖݂ 
൒ ݀ ௖݂. Therefore, to have a collusion-resistant mechanism, Cg would aim at minimizing the threshold ߤ 
used by the opponents since the estimated probability of penalizing is compared to this threshold. 
According to Theorem 1, to minimize ߤ in both cases, Cg has to maximize the value at the denominator 
ሺሺ݀ ௖݂ െ ݀ ௖݂ሻȀݓ௖ሻܲ݊ as all the other factors are out of Cg’s control. Ŷ 
In the repeated game, Cg has to consider the best window factor ݓ௖  that corresponds to the fake 
feedback submitted to the feedback pool. The value of ݓ௖ could be learned by Cg over time (while the 
detection accuracy ܦ௖  also increases over time). However, finding the best ݓ௖  is not guaranteed since 
there is always a risk of different fake feedback percentage maintained by the provider and consumer as a 
result of collusion agreement. Therefore, there is always a risk of false negative in penalizing the provider 
and consumer. 
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4. Related Work 
We consider two groups of frameworks related to our proposed model. The first group is about 
approaches that have been proposed for reputation assessment in MAS. Maximilien and Singh [1, 8] 
provided a complete overview regarding the parameters required to evaluate an agent’s reputation. 
Vogiatzis et al. [4] proposed a probabilistic model for computing the trust and reputation of rational 
agents in MAS. They proposed a set of assumptions that enable recognizing the agents that change their 
behavior to estimate their rates of change. Recently, Chapman et al. [6] developed a unified analytical 
framework for distributed agents investigating the best response with respect to sequential optimization 
problems, which consist of state evaluation, decision rule, and adjustment schedule procedures. Doing so, 
agents analyze the best response, which leads to their maximum payoff. In [9] J. Witkowski presents a 
reputation mechanism that elicits honest feedback in a Markov setting and requires a lower budget than 
the equivalent fixed setting. The objective is to show that hidden Markov models (HMM) provide a 
payment scheme that elicits honest reports from the agents after they have experienced the quality of the 
service. In general, honest reporting would cause the unique Nash equilibrium in induced game. A 
limitation of this setting is the high amount of common knowledge. Therefore, the collusion issue is not 
addressed in this work. 
The second group includes approaches proposed to develop sound reputation mechanisms, where 
entities are encouraged to act truthfully [3, 5, 7, 10]. Khosravifar et al. [7, 10] developed a game-theoretic 
approach categorized in one-shot and repeated games to emphasize the learning mechanism used by the 
agents, which leads them favor truth telling. Kastidou et al. [3] developed a framework representing safe 
information exchange regarding reputation assessment and agents are motivated to honestly report 
reputation information. All these approaches aim at maintaining a sound reputation mechanism according 
to aggregation frameworks similar to the ones proposed in the first group. However, these frameworks 
consider scenarios where only a part of the network (either the provider or consumer) play important role, 
which reflect partial collusion, i.e. only between agents of the same type. We believe that in dynamic 
MAS, a sound reputation system should consider the benefits of all the players. 
The closest model to our work is the collusion-resistant reputation mechanism proposed in [2] in which 
the authors investigate incentive-compatible payment mechanisms. Malicious agents’ behaviors are 
analyzed in different scenarios to maintain an automated mechanism design that yields the best reputation 
assessment in the environment. The proposed mechanism is limited in the sense that it is based on a linear 
optimization setting that do not perform well in specific situations like when false alarms are generated 
through the reputation mechanism. In general, the reputation mechanism is assumed to function correctly, 
which makes lying a Nash equilibrium at some point. In our paper, we investigate the collusion and 
address the collusion-resistant setting under the assumption that the controller agent is also making 
mistakes. This overall encourages the provider and consumer agents to analyze the characteristics of the 
controller through the collusion reports sent to them. 
5. Conclusion 
The contribution of this paper is the proposition of a collusion-resistant reputation mechanism 
applicable to multi agent settings. The reputation mechanism is supervised by a controller agent that 
reveals the reputation value of provider agents to the consumers. The proposed approach investigates the 
settings under which the truth action is the Nash equilibrium. In the game-theoretic analysis, rational 
agents compute their expected payoff and according to the available information from past events in the 
game, they decide about their further actions. The objective of the controller agent is to update the 
settings such that the truth action yields the maximum gain for the provider and consumer agents. Our 
model is distinguished from related work in the sense that a game-theoretic (followed by empirical) 
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analysis considering all the agents that are involved in the reputation mechanism is provided together with 
its aggregation process. Moreover, false alarms generated by the controller agent are also considered by 
the providers and consumers in their strategies and being investigated in experiments. 
Our plan for future work is to integrate optimization techniques to our game and investigate in details 
the best value for ݓ௖ , which potentially impacts the expected payoffs computed by the provider and 
consumer agents. We also need to analyze in depth the scenario where some providers can collude to 
destroy the reputation of others by causing false alarms generated by the controller. 
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